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Due to varying local revenue collection capacities and interest group activities, revenue decentralization (RD)
may lead to increased inequality. This paper provides empirical evidence, however, that, if coupled with good
governance, RD could improve income distribution.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and income distribution. One
channel through which these variables can be linked is the already existing inequalities across the
regions of a country with respect to economic activity, cultural and demographic characteristics. Given
such inequalities that often also imply income differentials, different profiles of local spending needs and
revenue collection capacities are likely to be observed across regions. Focusing on cross-regional
differentials in revenue collection capacity, one can argue that the greater the extent of revenue
decentralization (RD), the worse may be income distribution. This hinges upon the argument that, since
income differentials would likely to coincide with politically powerful interest groups that could better0165-1765/$ -
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revenue collection and thus widen the income gaps both within regions and, thus, across the country.
Hence, higher RD could possibly lead to inefficient and/or unequitable revenue collection decisions
due to underutilization of the revenue potential of politically powerful groups.1 Both Bradhan and
Mookherjee (1998) and Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) argue that if local vested interests are powerful, in
the absence of local accountability, decentralization could increase social fragmentation. RD may thus
widen income gaps within localities, which would manifest in increased inequality at the country level as
well. This effect, however, can be limited or eliminated by good governance that provides checks and
balances in fiscal activities. Moreover, since local governments are more familiar with local revenue
sources than central governments, decentralization may lead to more efficient and/or equitable revenue
collection under good governance.
Few recent studies have analyzed the macroeconomic effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), with a
particular focus on RD. Jin and Zou (2002), for example, have demonstrated that RD has a limiting
impact on the size of the aggregate government. Both King and Ma (2001) and Neyapti (2004) show that
RD has a negative impact on inflation, where the latter shows that this effect is reinforced by both central
bank independence and local accountability. Neyapti (2005) also shows that good governance, structural
and institutional factors enhance the negative effect of RD on deficits. Hence, regardless of the type of
the macroeconomic variable whose association with FD is investigated, almost all theoretical and
empirical studies on fiscal decentralization emphasize the effect of institutional environment on the
effectiveness of FD.
Against this background, the main hypothesis of this paper is formulated as follows: in case of good
governance, RD may help to improve income distribution. In other words, we expect a non-negative
ASSOCIATION between RD and the GINI coefficient unless there is good governance. This paper
provides an empirical test of this hypothesis using a panel study that has a time dimension of three at most,
standing for the past three decades. The analysis provides strong support in favor of our hypothesis,
indicating that RD does indeed make income distribution more equal in case of good governance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and methodology. Section 3 presents the
empirical results and Section 4 concludes.2. The model, data and methodology
Suppose that each local government has an effort level ei for tax collection, call it tax effort. Hence,
total tax collection for local government i is:
Ti ¼ RjeijdtijdLij ; i ¼ 1 . . . . . .R ; j ¼ 1 . . . . . . Ji
where t is the average tax rate across all local governments and Lij represents the local taxable resources
in region i, belonging to group j. We may assume that the tax rates are determined centrally and thus
tij= tj. To further simplify the problem without loss of generality, we may assume that all regions have1 In a similar spirit, Verardi (2005) demonstrates the positive link between the degree of proportionality in the electoral systems
and income equality. Verardi conducts his analysis in a set of highly democratic countries, utilizing a different measure of income
inequality (based on Luxembourg Income Study) than the one used in the current paper (Deninger and Squire, 1996). The current
study uses not only highly democratic set of countries that are selected based mainly on the availability GINI coeffients.
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region to region. We consider that different political powers of J groups in each region reflect upon the
tax collection effort eij, where 0VeijV1. Then, our hypothesis is that when at least some of the Ji groups,
the number of which may differ from locality to locality, are more influential than the rest of the groups
and appear to have special interests, then Ti may differ across the regions not only in Li, but also in eij.
This means that while Li already constitutes a source of deviation in tax collection capacity across the
regions, a further source of variation in tax collection is the tax effort. As we argue here, tax effort may
reflect relative political influences of different socio-economic groups across the regions on the local
government’s ability to collect taxes. Indeed, even if eij are the same across i but different across the J
groups in each region, the argument here would still be valid.
This set up implies that different tax burdens on each group j can arise even beyond the effects of tj
and Lij. We argue that eij being at the discretion of each local government i in case revenue collection is
decentralized indicates greater discretion, or variability in eij, than a central government choice of an ej
in case of no fiscal decentralization. It is due to the potential of such unequal treatment of various
constituencies by local governments that we argue that RD may widen income disparities, and hence
worsen income distribution. On the other hand, we argue that good governance amounts to both equal
and full tax effort, in the sense of collecting the tax revenues pertaining to all J groups in an equal
fashion such that eij =1 for all j. If local governments have a better account of, and access to, local
resources (Lij) than the central government, RD may actually lead to more equal income distribution
under good governance.
To test our hypothesis, we employ the following model:
Y dist ¼ f RD; control variablesð Þ
where Y-dist stands for income distribution and measured by (the logarithm of) GINI coefficient (lGINI,
where the larger numbers indicating worse distribution), based on Deininger and Squire (1996).2 The
data are in averages over the past three decades: 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, where available. As for the
control variables, we use per capita income in constant Dollar terms (Ypc) in logarithms.3 Another
potential control variable is inflation since it has a redistributive role via market frictions or expectational
asymmetries. We use a transformed version of inflation: D4, to eliminate the possible estimation
problems emanating from the large variations in the inflation rate across countries. To these, we add RD,
and the governance variables in interaction with RD. RD is calculated as the revenue obtained by local
and state and provincial levels of the government in ratio to aggregate government revenues.
Governance variables, obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2002), are: control of corruption (contcorr), rule
of law (rule), political instability (polins), governmental efficiency (goveff), voice and accountability
(voacc) and regulatory quality (requal).52 The data is also available online, at: http://www.worldbank.org (search by the title: Measuring Income Inequality Database). We
only employ the bacceptQ category for the GINI coefficient that stands for high quality data.
3 According to Kuznets (1955), the relationhsip between income distribution and the level of income is an inverted U shape.
To test this hypothesis we also performed the estimation with both Ypc and Ypc-squared terms. But the results did not change,
with the additional term being found insignificant.
4 D = inflation rate / (1+ inflation rate). D is used to eliminate the large cross-country differences in inflation figures so as to
increase efficiency of estimation.
5 The estimates for each of all the six governance variables are based on an analysis of wide-ranging data sources-comprised
of both polls and surveys conducted in individual countries (see, Kaufmann et al., 2002).
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model since neither the number of countries nor the number of observations employed are sufficiently
large. The data set consists of three decade averages of GINI coefficient for 37 countries. The sample can
be characterized as mainly cross-sectional as the total number of observations is only one for some
countries and a few for some others, adding up to 54 in total.6 The following section reports the
estimation of the following models.
Y dist ¼ constantþ b1RDþ b2Dþ b3Ypcþ b4LA ð1Þ
Y dist ¼ constantþ a1RD4 governanceþ a2Dþ a3Ypcþ a4LA ð2Þ
where LA stands for a dummy for Latin American countries that, on average, exhibit greater income
inequalities than could be explained by the control variables.3. Regression results
Table 1 presents the results of the random effects estimation of both models (1 and 2). Due to high
correlations between RD and its interactions with the governance variables, we report the results of the
regression separately for RD and for the interactive variables.7
As the table indicates, neither inflation nor income levels explain the differences in income
distribution across the countries. In addition, while the level of income seems to have a favorable effect
on income distribution, this effect becomes insignificant once RD is used as an explanatory variable. RD
has a significant negative effect on the GINI coefficient (where the logarithm is simply used to overcome
the possible scale problems in estimation, while using it in levels yields very similar results) when it is
interacted with the governance indicators (columns 3 to 8). RD, by itself, however does not seem to
significantly affect income distribution. In addition, LA dummy is significant and indicates that, having
controlled for inflation, income levels and degree of revenue decentralization, Latin America has worse
income distribution than the rest of the countries in the sample.
We tried another specification that replaces either RD or RD* governance with RD that is in
interaction with a dummy that takes the value of 1 in case there exist local elections. Those regressions
returned no significant result for this additional variable, indicating that the existence of local elections,
which proxies for local accountability as Neyapti (2005) argues, does not improve the results obtained
above.
The results reported in Table 1, however, may leave one wondering about the part of the effect of
RD*governance that is attributable to the RD alone. Indeed, once both RD and the governance terms are
used separately in the same regression, one observes that only the governance variables are significant
with a negative sign, where RD has an insignificant coefficient.8 This appears to indicate that it is
governance, and not RD that has an effect in reducing the GINI coefficient.6 We report the country and decade observations used in the empirical analysis in the Appendix.
7 We observe that if we estimate the effects of RD and RD*governance together, RD gets a positive and significant coefficient
and the other gets a negative significant one.
8 On the other hand, using both RD and RD*governance together leads to a positive-turned coefficient of RD itself, which is
one of the indications of multicollinearity (see, Greene, 1993, for example).
Table 1
Estimation of models (1) and (2) with random effects
Explanatory Variables: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Governance
Voacc Polins Goveff Requal Rule Contcorr
RD(revenue decent.) 0.44
(1.48)
RD*governance 0.75 0.87 0.93 0.74 0.86 0.89
(2.27)** (2.41)** (2.66)** (2.20)** (2.61)** (2.62)**
D =inf / (1+ inf) 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04
(0.36) (0.44) (0.35) (0.30) (0.28) (0.37) (0.28) (0.25)
Income per capita 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
(1.95)* (0.01) (0.41) (0.58) (0.68) (0.36) (0.68) (0.73)
Latin America dummy 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.27
(4.14)*** (3.09)*** (3.03)*** (3.08)*** (2.84)*** (3.25)*** (2.69)*** (2.74)***
Constant 3.84 53.64 3.58 3.55 3.53 7.64 8.64 9.64
(31.86)*** (16.81)*** (16.86)*** (16.63)*** (16.78)*** (16.81)*** (16.81)*** (16.81)***
R-bar squared 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
# of observations 97 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Dependent variable: Income distribution (logarithm of GINI coefficient).
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the t-ratios. D =[inflation rate / (1+ inflation rate)]. RD=Ratio of local and state government
revenues in total revenues of the government.
* Reject null at 10% significance level.
** Reject null at 5% significance level.
*** Reject null at 1% significance level.
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estimation problems. In order to capture the effect of RD on GINI, one may therefore need to concentrate
on the part of RD — that is not correlated with governance. Hence, in what follows, we apply a method
to disentangle the effect of governance from RD*governance observed in columns 3 to 8 of Table 1. To
do this, we first regress RD on each of the governance terms and use the residuals emerging from that
regression in interaction with governance, along with the governance terms. This method can be
regarded as a robustness test of the interpretation provided for columns 3 to 8 above.10
The modified model therefore is:
Y dist ¼ constantþ c1RDresid4governanceþ c2governanceþ c3Dþ c4Ypcþ c5LA ð3Þ
where RDresid is obtained from the regression of RD on each governance term, and stands for—the
part of the RD term that is not explained by governance. Hence, we expect that if RD has an effect
on GINI in the presence of good governance, beyond the effect of good governance itself, c1 should
be negative and significant. Table 2 reports the estimation of Model (3) using the six governance
terms.9 The correlation between RD and the various governance measures ranges from 8% to 17%.
10 In addition, we applied theHausman test of endogeneity, wherewe used expenditure decentralization as an instrument, besides the
LAdummy,D, Ypc and each of the governance variables at a time, to explainRD.Using the residuals of this first stage of estimation to
estimateY-dist yields no significant coefficients of the residual terms, supporting ourmethod that assumes lack of endogeneity in RD.
Table 2
Estimation of model (2)
Explanatory variables: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Governance:
Voacc Polins Goveff Requal Rule Contcorr
RDresid*governance 1.19 1.31 1.56 1.16 1.41 1.53
(1.97)** (2.04)** (2.45)** (1.91)* (2.34)*** (2.46)**
Governance 0.49 0.51 0.66 0.64 0.51 0.52
(3.36)*** (3.04)*** (4.46)*** (3.74)*** (3.65)*** (3.64)***
D =inf / (1+ inf) 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.005 0.0002
(0.50) (0.33) (0.21) (0.28) (0.04) (0.00)
Income per capita 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05
(1.21) (1.23) (2.15)** (0.28) (1.62) (1.67)*
Latin America dummy 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.18 0.21
(3.41)*** (3.25)*** (2.21)*** (4.23)*** (2.11)** (2.60)***
Constant 3.64 3.63 3.48 3.73 3.52 3.49
(19.35)*** (18.77)*** (18.71)*** (20.55)*** (18.40)*** (18.15)***
R-bar squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
# of observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Dependent variable: Income distribution (logarithm of GINI coefficient). (Random effects model)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the t-ratios. D =[inflation rate / (1+ inflation rate)]. RD=Ratio of local and state government
revenues in total revenues of the government.
* Reject null at 10% significance level.
** Reject null at 5% significance level.
*** Reject null at 1% significance level.
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governance, revenue decentralization helps to make income distribution more equal and the magnitude
of this effect appears to be greater than the direct effect of good governance on GINI.11 While the
remainder of the control variables yield virtually the same results as in Table 1, in columns 3 and 6 we
observe positive effects of income per capita, which is possibly due to its high correlation with
governance (more than 80% with each of the 6 governance terms).
Though we choose not to report here again for the possible biases due to multicollinearity, the
regressions in Table 2 are also repeated with RDresid’s added as separate terms in all the six columns.
Those results also generally confirm the results reported in Table 2, except that RDresid turns out to
be insignificant in the first and the forth columns only.12 This provides a further robustness check for
the general result that, even though RDresid is negative and significant (at lower levels of significance)
itself for four out of the six regressions corresponding to different governance measures, its interaction
with governance is robustly significant and negative, besides the significantly negative governance
terms.11 If the first stage, where residuals from the regression of RD on governance are obtained, is performed with ordinary least squares
rather than random effects technique, then the findings are partially supportive. In the case OLS technique is performed for the first
stage, the estimation of model (3) yields significant negative coefficients for RD*governance in cases of voacc; polins and rule; and
insignificant one in the rest of the cases. Table 2 above reports the results of random effects model used in the first stage as well.
12 Those results are available upon request from the author.
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The panel investigation in this paper indicates that revenue decentralization may have a favorable
impact on income distribution if accompanied with good governance. The impacts of inflation or income
level on income distribution, on the other hand, are not found robustly significant. The policy
implication that emerges is that revenue decentralization is an advisable policy reform—provided that
good governance exists. This finding is also consistent with the existing studies on the effects of fiscal
decentralization.Acknowledgments
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also owe thanks to Ferhat Emil and an anonymous referee.Appendix A. The list of countries and decades used in the analysisCountries Decade
Australia 80s
Australia 90s
Belgium 80s
Belgium 90s
Bolivia 80s
Bolivia 90s
Brazil 80s
Canada 80s
Canada 90s
Chile 80s
Chile 90s
Costa Rica 80s
Denmark 80s
Denmark 90s
Dominican Republic 80s
Dominican Republic 90s
Finland 80s
Finland 90s
Greece 80s
Guatemala 80s
India 80s
India 90s
Indonesia 80s
Indonesia 90s
Iran, Islamic ep. 80s
Ireland 80s
Italy 80s
Italy 90s
(continued on next page)
Countries Decade
Luxembourg 80s
Mauritius 80s
Mexico 80s
Mexico 90s
Netherlands 80s
Netherlands 90s
Nicaragua 90s
Norway 80s
Norway 90s
Panama 80s
Peru 90s
Portugal 80s
South Africa 90s
Spain 80s
Sri Lanka 80s
Sweden 80s
Sweden 90s
Thailand 80s
Thailand 90s
Trinidad and Tobago 80s
Tunisia 80s
United Kingdom 80s
United Kingdom 90s
United States 80s
United States 90s
Zimbabwe 90s
Appendix A (continued)
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